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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This doctoral dissertation discusses the willingness of political leaders in illiberal democracies 
to put national interests before private and factional interests in their foreign policy.1 Thus, the 
dissertation examines one variety of a fundamental question underlying much of political 
science: What do politicians want? Are they in office to pursue private and/or factional 
interests, or are they in office to enhance national interests? 
It seems fair to argue that it is a widespread international norm that politicians should 
use their office to pursue national interests, and not private or factional interest. Further, it 
also does not seem controversial to claim that this to a considerable extent is actually taking 
place. In fact, as far as the international behaviour of states is concerned, most of the current 
theoretical literature in the discipline of International Relations is based upon this assumption. 
At the same time, it is also known that private and factional interests might at times motivate 
politicians more powerfully than national interests. 
For these reasons, it is an intriguing question what factors make politicians be more 
motivated by private or national interests. Two alternative answers seem to suggest 
themselves. Firstly, politicians might pursue national interests because they think that this is 
what they should do. Thus, they are acting in accordance with the historically developed norm 
that politicians occupy their positions in order to promote the national interest. Secondly,  
politicians might pursue the national interest, not because they think they should do this, but 
because they think that this in the long run also is to the most benefit for themselves or their 
factions (rational choice). According to some theorists, whose work will be discussed in more 
detail below, this latter interpretation presupposes an institutional setting that “forces” the 
politician to pursue national interests − a democracy. A further assumption of these theorists 
is that most leaders want to stay in power, either because they like power, or because they can 
exploit their position to promote private or factional interests, or both. For this latter reason 
                                                 
1 The term “illiberal democracies” is borrowed from Fareed Zakaria. Zakaria defines  liberal 
democracy as a political system characterised not only by free and fair elections, but “also by the rule 
of law, a separation of powers, and also the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion 
and property”. An illiberal democracy, on the other hand, often has a system in which many of the 
elements not directly connected with the elections are missing or seriously encroached upon, and where 
also the elections themselves might not be entirely free and fair, but where they still are regularly held 
and represent a real possibility for the incumbent not to remain in power. See Fareed Zakaria, “The 
Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec. 1997), pp. 22-43, and Fareed Zakaria, The 
Future of Freedom – Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2003), chapter three, pp.89-118.  The types of regimes that Zakaria calls illiberal 
democracies also go under a lot of other names in the theoretical literature. David Collier and Steven 
Levitsky claim that there are hundreds of these terms, essentially describing the same phenomenon. For 
more on this, see David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation and in Comparative Research”, World Politics, Vol.49, No.3 (1997);  Marina Ottaway, 
Democracy Challenged – The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington DC:Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2003). 
their first inclination would be to let narrow private and factional interests rather that national 
interests guide their foreign policy. However, if they do that to a degree that the populations 
in democracies find unacceptable they will lose the next election. They therefore have an 
incentive to pursue national interest to a degree that makes them seem patriotic and helps 
them secure re-election, since that is the only way they can retain the office they need in order 
to pursue their private and factional interests. 
One way to test a hypothesis about politicians pursuing national interests also because 
of normative pressure would be to look for national interest motivated behaviour in 
institutional settings that do not force politicians to pursue these interests in order to stay in 
power. That is what this doctoral project sets out to do. It will look for national interest 
motivated behaviour in the institutional setting of illiberal democracy, since it is a relatively 
common assumption that the leaders of such regimes tend to cater to the factional interests of 
powerful domestic lobbies rather than pursue national interests in order to stay in power.  
Thus, provided that staying in power is what they want, one should expect their policies, and 
in this case foreign policies, to reflect factional rather then national interests. If it is possible 
to point to examples where these politicians pursued policies that were potentially 
undermining or at least did not contribute to their ambition of continuing to stay in power, 
that would lend support to the normative thesis. 
The next chapter will discuss the history of the norm of pursuing national interests, or 
as it will be called in that chapter “reason of state”. The term “reason of state” is the precursor 
to the term “national interest”, and it gradually gave away to the latter term during the second 
half of the twentieth century.2 Emphasis will be given both to how the early spokesmen for 
the norm saw its relation to specific institutions, and to how this norm came to arrive in 
Russia. The latter point seems particularly relevant, since all the case studies in this 
dissertation come from Russia or from areas that have been under Russian control for 
considerable time (Kazakhstan was gradually put under Russian rule from the 1730s, a 
process that was completed in the middle of the nineteenth century, and most of Ukraine was 
under Russian control since the late eighteenth century).  
The third chapter will proceed by placing the research question within its current 
theoretical context. That is, it will explain how the research question is dealt with in various 
relevant branches of political science theory, and what answers the different theories suggest 
to this question.  
                                                 
2 According to Ole Wæver “It is not a very powerful move for any statesman today to stand up and try 
to justify an action by “necessity” or ‘reason of state’; they have lost their political standing. That 
speech act is likely to misfire. Increasingly, as the other terms faded, the burden came on the term 
‘interest’ or ‘national interest’ − maybe because of the terminological slide from raison d’etat over 
interests of state to national interests”, see Ole Wæver, “Security: A Conceptual History for 
International Relations”, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies 
Association, New Orleans, 24-27 March 2002, p.41. 
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The fourth chapter, which precedes the case studies, will discuss the research design 
and methods employed in the dissertation. After the five case studies, a final chapter will 
make some general observations on the role of private and factional vs. national interests in 
the foreign policy of the three countries in question, and also discuss what theoretical 
inferences can be drawn from the case studies. 
  
2. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE “REASON OF STATE” 
 
”Even tyrannical regimes that rarely or never consult the 
People attempt to justify their rule by populist claims. The 
view that the interests of all should determine the ends of the 
state is commonplace today. We forget that it was once a 
radical and controversial idea”. 
Christopher W. Morris, 20003 
 
One of the assumptions upon which this project rests, is that there exists a historically 
developed norm that state leaders should put national interests before private and factional 
interests in their foreign policy. However, before I start to discuss how this norm as a type of 
motivation for political action relates to other types of motivation, I will briefly elaborate on 
what is known about the historical development of the norm. This is important, among other 
reasons, because the question of whether the norm is dependent on certain regime types 
(democracies) or not in order to be honoured, has been intimately discussed alongside the 
historical development of the norm. Discussions on the connections between the norm and 
regime types can be traced back to the first political theorists that argued for the norm.  
This chapter will proceed by first describing the origins of the ideas of “the common 
good” and “reason of state” in Italy, and by depicting the spread of these ideas to other 
countries. Then, it will discuss the potential discrepancy between the spread of the ideas and 
the extent to which they were lived up to in practice. Further, the spread of the ideas to Russia 
will be examined in some detail. And finally, the chapter includes an account of how the 
ideologues of the ideas of “the common good” and “the reason of state” saw particular 
institutional settings or types of regimes as necessary for these ideas to be honoured.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Christopher W. Morris, “The very idea of popular sovereignty: ‘We the People’ reconsidered”, Social 
Philosophy & Policy Foundation, Vol. 17, No.1 (Winter 2000), p.12. 
 3
2.1 Ideological origins 
 
The independent Italian city-states, prior to the Renaissance, was were the modern 
interpretation of both the idea of “the common good” and the idea of “reason of state” 
originated. In defiance of the papal authority, these city-states had started to set themselves up 
as independent polities in the eleventh century. The so-called advice books for city 
magistrates are the first evidence in print of the idea that the leader should put the interests of 
the city as a whole before any private or factional interests. The first known such advice book 
was the Oculus Pastoralis, that was published by an anonymous author c. 1220.4  
Later, mostly in the thirteenth century, these city-states changed their form of 
government from elected leadership to hereditary princely rule. However, the idea of the 
common good survived. The advice books were replaced by the so-called mirror-for-princes 
books, of which Macchiavelli’s The Prince is probably the most famous. 
It should be noted that the idea of the common good was not an original idea of the 
authors of the advice books and the mirror-for-princes books. These authors relied heavily on 
the classics of Greek and Roman philosophy and political thought, and the idea of the 
common good can be found in the works of both Aristotle and Cicero. Cicero writes that 
“anyone who looks after the interests of only one part of a citizen body, while neglecting the 
rest, introduces into the government of a city the most pernicious element of all, namely 
sedition and discord”.5 
The Renaissance idea of the common good developed earlier than the idea of the 
reason of state, and they were connected to different historical developments. Before the 
advice books, the dominant idea of political legitimacy was the so-called Augustinian 
assumption that government was God-given.6 It was further assumed that the only form this 
God-given rule could take was hereditary monarchy. The idea of God-given government also 
naturally gave the papal authority a strong say in the development of the secular polities. 
Thus, when the Italian city-states tried to rid themselves of both papal authority in secular 
affairs and of hereditary monarchy at the same time, they were in need of a legitimating 
concept other than God-given rule. The idea of the common good became that concept. 
The reason of state, however, was developed as an idea at the time when these city 
states largely abandoned elective government in favour of princely rule.7 One of the pioneers 
                                                 
4 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.4. 
5 Ibid., p.24. 
6 Ibid., p.11, and Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and the Public Sphere”, in Jeff Weintraub and Krishan 
Kumar, eds., Public and Private in Thought and Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997), p.78. 
7 The development of the doctrine of “reason of state” was heavily dependent on a change from moral 
concerns and passions to interests as sources of political legitimacy, for a thorough elaboration of this 
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of the reason of state idea was Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), who was one of the very 
first to explicitly use the term.8 In Italy there was at that time a widespread feeling that 
elective government led to too much chaos, and that there was a need for stronger and more 
permanent government. At the same time, there was little willingness to go back to the idea of 
God-given government, which could lead to re-subordination to the papal authority.  The new 
princely polities therefore needed an ideology that legitimated their rule without making them 
servants neither to the wishes and desires of the people nor to Rome.9 The “reason of state” 
idea was useful here. 
In these early days, however, the revolutionary idea of the impersonal state had not 
yet been developed. Macchiavelli at the time came closest to promoting such an idea. He 
made a clear distinction between il stato and those who were in charge of it, but he did not 
take the next step of seeing the state as an actor in its own right, with interests that cannot be 
reduced to the interests of the leader. Macchiavelli’s il stato is primarily to be understood as 
the prince’s apparatus of power.10 
The idea of the impersonal state, which implies a clear distinction between the leader 
and the realm or stato that he ruled, became the central topic of the next phase in the 
development of the “reason of state” ideology. According to Skinner, this development 
should be attributed to   
 
“those theorists whose aspirations included a desire to legitimise the more 
absolutist forms of government that began to prevail in Western Europe in the early 
part of the seventeenth century. It was as a by-product of their arguments, and in 
particular of their efforts to insist that the powers of government must be something 
other than the powers of the government under another guise, that the concept of the 
state as a distinct person and as the seat of sovereignty was finally articulated with 
full self-consciousness”.11  
 
The foremost of these theorists were Henry Hobbes, Jean Bodin, and later also Samuel 
Pufendorf.12 
                                                                                                                                            
development, see Jens Bartelson, A genealogy of sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), pp.154-185. 
8 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.158. 
9 On the point about independence from the Holy Roman Empire and the use for the “reason of state” 
concept in France, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1994), p.58. 
10 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.378. 
11 Ibid., p.395. 
12 On Pufendorf on this point, see Ibid.., p.395., and David Saunders and Ian Hunter, “Bringing the 
state to England: Andrew Tooke’s translation of Samuel Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis”, 
History of Political Thought, Vol.XXIV, No.2 (Summer 2003), p.222. 
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The separation of the state from the leader made it possible for the “reason of state 
idea” to bloom, and according to Maurizio Viroli, the transition of politics from “civil 
philosophy” to “reason of state” was firmly established in Italy by the end of the sixteenth 
century.13 By that time, the idea had also for some time been spreading to other parts of 
Europe. 
 
2.2 The export of the ideas from Italy 
 
Skinner writes that both the stato concept and the “common good” thinking were imported to 
Northern Europe in the early decades of the sixteenth century by the Erasmian humanists.14 
However, as already mentioned above in 2.1, this was before the idea of the impersonal state. 
The latter, which was a necessary precondition for the doctrine of “the reason of state”, spread 
from Italy to the other European powers at an uneven pace. Kenneth Dyson states that a major 
reason for the spread of this idea was “a practical concern with state-building and an 
intellectual interest in raison d’etat [that] stemmed from a perceived need for a vigorous 
response to the combination of enemies abroad with factionalism and the threat of disorder at 
home”.15 
It seems first to have spread to France, where a clear conception of the state as an 
agent different from both the leader and the people seems to have developed from about the 
1570s.16 The idea also relatively early arrived in England, where for example Thomas Starkey 
in his early sixteenth century Dialogue makes the same distinction.17 In England, however, 
the idea never received the same popularity as it did on the continent.18  
In Spain the idea was established from about the 1650s, and in Germany at bit later. 
Kenneth Dyson claims that in Germany the term staat was considered “a cold and exacting 
abstraction” until late eighteenth century.19 However, it is worth noticing that there is 
substantial evidence that Frederick the Great of Prussia, who ruled from 1740 to 1786, saw 
himself as a servant of the Prussian state.20 Although the Germans were relatively late 
developers in this respect, the Germany provinces later produced some of the most radical 
proponents of the “reason of state” idea − the nineteenth century German Machtstaat theorists 
                                                 
13 Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State − The acquisition and transformation of the 
language of politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 238.  
14 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.373. 
15 Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Martin Robertson,1980), p.41. 
16 William F. Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 
p.45.  
17 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.385. 
18 On England as an aberrant case in this respect, see Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, 
pp.36-44. 
19 Ibid., p.27. 
20 Ibid., p.28. 
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(von Moltke, Clausewitz, and Treitschke). One of these, Heinrich von Treitschke, claimed 
that the state is “a moral force unto itself”.21 The spread to Russia seems to have taken place 
roughly at the same time as the spread to Germany, but that will be dealt with in more detail 
below. Skinner claims that the idea of the “reason of state” had become widely accepted in 
continental Europe by the middle of the eighteenth century.22 
For comparison it might also be interesting to note that the first political thinkers in 
China to have propagated the idea of the impersonal state were Yan Fu and Wang Jingwei 
around the turn of the twentieth century. Yan Fu pointed to the Westerners’ loyalty to the 
impersonal state rather than to its leader, and the nationalist Wang argued that the Chinese 
monarchical traditions with no distinction between leader and state were an impediment to 
development of a modern state.23 
 
2.3 Theory and practice 
 
So far, this discussion has been about the spread of the ideas of “the common good” 
and “reason of state” among intellectuals and to some extent also among political and 
bureaucratic practitioners. However, the acceptance of an idea at the level of rhetoric does not 
necessarily imply that this idea henceforth becomes the main motive for political action. 
Richard Tuck has pointed out that “one of the most striking features of late sixteenth-century 
European intellectual life is the divorce between an academic moral science, the material of 
university courses, and the ethical and political attitudes of the people actually involved (even 
if at some remove) in the business of government”.24 If we compare the works of scholars 
who have studied the development of the idea of “reason of state” with the works of scholars 
who have studied the actual behaviour of leaders at approximately the same time, two rather 
different depictions emerge.  
Julia Adams has claimed that contemporary public choice theory could find plenty of 
empirical evidence in the politics of the feudal and early modern states, and that for example 
nepotism was seen as normal in the Netherlands almost down to the end of the early modern 
era.25   
                                                 
21 Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe, p.103. 
22 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.408. 
23 Lawrence R. Sullivan, “Intellectual and Political Controversies over Authority in China: 1898-1922”, 
paper found on the Internet at 
http://www2.eastwestcenter.org/education/culauthasia/ok/papers/p_Sullivan.pdf 
24 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p.4. 
25 Julia Adams, “Culture in Rational-Choice Theories of State-Formation”, in George Steinmetz, ed., 
State/Culture – State-Formation after the Cultural Turn (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1999), pp.101-102, and Julia Adams, “The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the 
early modern Netherlands”, Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No.4 (August 1994), p.508. 
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Oleg Kharkhordin, relying heavily of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, sees the concept of 
the “reason of state” in very instrumental terms. He argues that this idea has historically been 
a tool for the leader to control the masses rather than an independent motivation for the 
leader’s political actions, and that this is often the case also today.26  
Other scholars admit that many leaders at some point in time indeed started to care 
more for the “reason of state” than for private or factional interest, but that this happened 
much later than the spread of the idea itself. Benno Teschke argues that in 17th-century 
continental Europe  
 
“the centralization of sovereignty did not entail a separation of public and 
private realms, of politics and economics, since sovereignty was henceforth 
personalized by the king, regarding the realm as his patrimonial property”, and that 
“public policy and a fortiori, foreign policy were not conducted in the name of raison 
d’etat or the national interest, but in the name of dynastic interests”.27  
 
Teschke considers the actually “depersonalised state” a phenomenon of the nineteenth 
century.28 
Although the ideas of “the common good” and later the impersonal state spread 
relatively early to France, this did not for example stop Louis XIV from engaging in 
exceptional rent-seeking that had nothing to do with the “common good”.29 Similarly, the 
Dutch  pamphleteer Claudius Civilis wrote of the Netherlands in 1747 that “everyone knows 
that the quickest way to get rich is to get into government and that is the reason that men pay 
to get in”.30 
Thus, there is plenty of historical evidence that the norm was not honoured, even after 
the middle of the eighteenth century, the time when the idea had become widely accepted in 
continental Europe according to Skinner. However, there is also reason to expect that “reason 
of state” gradually became a motivating factor at least for some politicians, and not just a tool 
with which to control the masses. It just took a long time to move from the acceptance of an 
idea to its establishment as a functioning norm for political conduct.  
                                                 
26 Oleg Kharkhordin, “What is the state? The Russian concept of gosudarstvo in the European context”, 
History and Theory, Vol.40 (May 2001), pp.227-237, see also Pierre Bourdieu, “Is a Disinterested Act 
Possible?” in his Practical Reasons (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), pp. 75-91. 
27 Benno Teschke, “Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from 
Absolutism to Capitalism”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, No.1, 2002, pp. 9 and 
13. 
28 Ibid., p.22. 
29 On Louis XIV and rent-seeking, see Robert E. Ekelund  Jr. and Robert D. Tollison, Mercantilism as 
a Rent-Seeking Society – Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1981), pp.74-110. 
30 Quoted in Adams, “The familial state…”,  p.507. 
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 2.4 The case of Russia 
 
The first traces of “impersonal state” and “common good” thinking in Russia can be 
found in the reign of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich (reign 1645-1676). For example, one of his 
most trusted chancellors, Afanasii Ordyn-Nashchokin, claimed in his writings that he was 
working not only for the tsar but also for the Russian state.31 The second half of the 
seventeenth century also saw its first Russian equivalent of the Italian authors of mirror-for-
princes books − Simeon Polotskii. Polotskii was in the business of writing panegyrics to the 
tsars, and he used this opportunity to carefully give them advice. One of his main points was 
that the tsars should not only be concerned with their own interests, but also with the well 
being of their people.32 In 1682, in a new law regulating the system of appointment to public 
office, Tsar Alekseii for the first time made an explicit reference to “the common good”.33 
According to Liudmila Chernaya, the idea of the impersonal state came as a logical 
consequence of the “common good” idea in Russia.34 
However, it was with Aleksei’s son Peter the Great, that the “reason of state” was 
introduced as an explicit doctrine. Peter’s best known declaration of this doctrine is his speech 
to his army before the famous battle of Poltava against the Swedes in 1709:  
 
“Warriors! Here is the hour that will decide the fate of the fatherland. You should 
think that you are fighting not for Peter, but for the state, entrusted to Peter, for your 
kin, for fatherland…And know of Peter that he does not care about his life but only 
that Russia lives in bliss and glory for your well-being”.35  
 
This could of course be brushed aside as pure rhetoric, but according to Oleg Kharkhordin, 
“commentaries now assume that belief in the common good and service to the fatherland was 
personally important for Peter I”.36 
Peter’s chief reform ideologue was Feofan Prokopevich. Prokopevich’s thinking on 
leader, state and subjects was very close to the thinking of the Western pro-absolutists such as 
                                                 
31 Kharkhordin, “What is the state?…”, p.219. 
32 Liudmila Chernaia, “Ot idei sluzhenia gosudariu k idée sluzhenia otchestvu v russkoi 
obshchestvennoi mysli vtoroi poloviny XVII – nachala XVIII v”, (From the Idea of Serving the Czar to 
the Idea of Serving the Fatherland in Russian Social Thought of the Second Half of the Seventeenth – 
Beginning of the Eighteenth Centuries), in A.L. Andreev and K. Kh. Delokarov, eds., 
Obshchestvennaia mysl: Issledovaniia i publikatsii, vypusk 1(Social thought: Investigations and 
Publications, Issue I), (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp.32-33. 
33 Ibid., p.34. 
34 ibid., p.34. 
35 Kharkhordin, “What is the state?…”, p.220. 
36 Ibid, p.221. 
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Hobbs and Bodin. In the same way as Hobbs and Bodin, Prokopevich did not want the idea 
that the Tsar should serve the people rather than himself to lead to a development where the 
tsar became hostage to the desires of the people. According to Prokopevich, the tsar should do 
what was best for the state also when the people did not like what he was doing.37 
After Peter, Catherine the Great continued to promote the new “reason of state” 
ideology, and among other actions she commissioned a Russian translation of Pufendorf’s De 
Officio Hominis et Civis, which became part of the curriculum for secondary education in 
Russia until 1819.38 However, the idea seems not to have penetrated the general Russian 
population until much later. Oleg Kharkhordin claims that in reality it was not until the 
Communist takeover that the Russian people came to see the political leader and the state as 
separate. As evidence of this, he points to Russian popular behaviour and perceptions from 
the Napoleonic invasion and the Crimean war. The peasantry never took up arms against the 
invader unless the French troops directly harassed the villages, because they saw the conflict 
as a quarrel among sovereigns rather than between states, and the majority of Russian soldiers 
in the Crimean war similarly saw the conflict as taking place between leaders rather than 
between a foreign state and their own state.39  
 
2.5 Institutional conditions for the common good and the reason of state 
 
Thus, the idea of “reason of state” came about as a combination of the ideas of “the 
common good” and “the impersonal state”. The proponents of “common good” thinking were 
from the start not just interested in selling their idea, they were also interested in identifying 
the institutional conditions under which it was most likely to be fulfilled.  
Since the origin of the idea of “the common good” was historically tightly connected 
with the establishment of elective systems of government in the Italian city states, it was 
stated explicitly by the early theorists that only elective governments could be trusted to work 
for the common rather than personal and factional good.  Bruno Latini wrote in his book 
Tresor from 1266 that only elected officials would work for the bien commun.40 This 
argument can also be found in Aristoteles’ writings.41 
It is perhaps more surprising that even Machiavelli claimed that elected leaders would 
be the ones most likely to promote “the common good”. Despite his general position that 
princes should allow themselves a free reign in terms of what means they used in order to  
                                                 
37 Chernaia, “Ot idei sluzhenia gosudariu…”, p.38. 
38 Oleg Kharkhordin, “What is the state? The Russian concept of gosudarstvo in the European context”, 
p.223. 
39 Ibid,  pp.225-226. 
40 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.382. 
41 Ibid,, p.33. 
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implement their policies, he nevertheless admitted that “most of the time, the things that 
benefit a prince harm his city, while the things that benefit the city harm the prince”, and thus 
elected princes would be the best.42  
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the emphasis on elected government was taken 
further within contractarian constitutionalist theory and Italian republican theory. Both strands 
of theory, according to Skinner, agreed that “all power corrupts and that absolute power 
corrupts absolutely. Any individual or group, once granted sovereignty over a community, 
will tend to promote their own interests at the expense of the common good”.43 Thus, the 
modern rational-choice-based belief that all politicians will exploit the office for personal 
profit unless there are institutional incentives preventing them from doing so has solid 
historical roots. 
 
3. THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND CURRENT THEORY 
 
As stated in the introduction, the research question in this dissertation is to what 
extent political leaders in illiberal democracies are willing to put national interests before 
private and factional interests in their foreign policy. The present chapter serves a triple 
purpose with regard to this research question. Firstly, it presents and discusses the theoretical 
contributions that will be explicitly employed in the analysis of the cases studies. Secondly, it 
presents and discusses bodies of theory and works of particular scholars that will not be 
explicitly used in the case studies, but that have helped to shape the research question. And 
thirdly, it points to where the theoretical inference that is drawn in the conclusion belongs 
within current theory on foreign policy. 
Kenneth Waltz proposed a distinction among first, second, and third image theories 
for explaining state behaviour.44 First image theories explain state action with reference to 
individuals (for example political psychology). Second image theories explain state action 
with reference to factors at the national and societal level (for example bureaucratic politics). 
Third image theories explain state action by seeing it as determined by international structures 
(for example neo-realism). My main interest here is in first and second image theories, and 
more specifically, those first and second image theories that deal with the relationship 
between private and factional versus national interests.  
The first part of this theoretical chapter will discuss different positions within the 
relatively independent body of political science called state theory (second image). State 
theory is chosen because of all the bodies of theory operating on the second image level, state 
                                                 
42 Quoted in Skinner, Visions of Politics, p.151. 
43 Quoted in Ibid, p.379. 
44 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 12-15. 
 11
theory is the one that most directly examines the question of whether states, in conducting a 
certain policy, should be seen as pursuing interests that are the state’s own (i.e cannot be 
reduced to a mix of societal interests), or as nothing more than an arena for competing private 
and factional interests.  
The second part of the chapter will discuss theory concerning one particular aspect of 
human purpose: the opposition between narrow self-interest and norm-guided behaviour as 
motivational factors for the individual. Policy is made by politicians, but what they decide to 
do is dependent both on their relations with other political actors around them (second image 
– state theory), and on their own judgements of factors such as what course of action would 
be the most beneficial to them versus what course of action would be the right action to take 
(first image – rational choice versus norm-guided behaviour). 45 
Finally, I will investigate to what extent current theory on foreign policy reflects and 
makes use of insights from the theoretical contributions discussed above, and indicate where 
the present project fits in.  
 
3.1 State theory 
 
There are three main schools of thought within state theorythe Weberian school, 
the pluralist school, and the Marxist school.  The Weberian school maintains that the state 
should be seen as “much more than a mere arena in which social groups make demands and 
engage in political struggles or compromises”.46 This school thus ascribes the state 
considerable will and initiative of its own.  
The pluralist school conceives of the state as a place for competition among actors 
and groups, where the policy outcomes reflect the balance of power among these actors and 
groups over a particular issue at a particular time. The state is for the pluralists first of all an 
arena where societal competitors can meet, and its main function is to regulate that 
competition. The pluralist school therefore does not open for autonomous state interests, 
initiatives and actions.   
The Marxist school is close to the pluralist school in that it conceives of the state as a 
place or an arena rather than as an actor. However, it differs from the pluralist school in 
focusing on the state as a tool for the economically strongest class (the capitalist class), rather 
than as an arena for regulated competition among several societal sub-groups. 
                                                 
45 For a study of the relevance of state theory for third image theories, see John M. Hobson, The State 
and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
46 Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, in Peter B. 
Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.8.  
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These schools can be connected to two logics that James G. March and Johan P. 
Olsen have described as bases for social action:  the logic of anticipated consequences and the 
logic of appropriateness. The first means that individuals are “driven by a logic of anticipated 
consequences and prior preferences”, the second means that individuals are “driven by a logic 
of appropriateness and senses of identity”.47 The first then corresponds to the logic of foreign 
policy as a tool for promoting the economic interests of the dominant economic groups. The 
second corresponds to the logic of foreign policy as a tool for furthering the national 
interest.48 
The logic of anticipated consequences seems to correspond to the pluralist and 
Marxist perspectives. According to March and Olsen, “Within the consequentialist 
perspective, politics is seen as aggregating individual preferences into collective actions by 
some procedures of bargaining, negotiation, coalition formation, and exchange”.49 On the 
level of the nation-state, this means that:  
 
“the coherence and significance of the nation-state in international relations is 
explained as the result of efforts of political actors to find structures favourable to 
their individual objectives. The major elements of the nation-state are assumed to 
thrive because they serve the interests of key actors. The interests of the political 
actors come first; the interests of the nation-states are derived from them”.50 
 
Similarly, the logic of appropriateness seems to coincide with the Weberian 
perspective. March and Olson describe the logic of appropriateness in the following way:  
 
“Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to 
particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing 
similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general 
concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and 
matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation. The pursuit of 
purpose is associated with identities more than with interests, and with the selection 
or rules more than with individual expectations”.51 
                                                 
47 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders”, 
in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, eds., Exploration and 
Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge MA, The MIT Press, 1999), p.309. 
48 This should be understood both in the rational choice fashion of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and 
in the norm and identity fashion of constructivism. They all have national interests as their point of 
reference. 
49 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics…”, p.309. 
50 Ibid., p.311. 
51 Ibid., p.311. 
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 Two questions are of particular importance in state theory. First, to what extent do 
states have interests of their own that cannot be reduced to societal interests, and second, what 
degree of autonomy from society do these states have to pursue these interests? The second of 
these questions can further be divided into a question of willingness and a question of 
capability. Capability, or as John M. Hobson specifies it, domestic agential state power, can 
be defined as “ability of the state to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the 
domestic realm, free of domestic social-structural requirements or the interests of non-state 
actors”.52 Ability, however, is not the focus of this project. In this dissertation ability is 
assumed to be present, but exercising it might have negative consequences for the politicians 
who do so, and the question is then to what extent they are willing to use their ability despite 
these potential negative consequences. 
While state theory is on the second image level, there is also a natural connection to 
first level theory of individual motivation. Christopher Pierson, in his survey of the field of 
state theory, characterises the rationalist individualist public choice viewpoint as a statist 
perspective on state theory. However, this conclusion seems largely based on the normative 
anti-state side of public choice. As Pierson writes, public choice and other neo-liberal theories 
see the state as “an increasingly domineering and malign influence, imposing itself upon 
society”.53 When it comes to the individual motivations of political action, on the other hand, 
public choice seems to have much more in common with the pluralist and Marxist 
perspectives. Both these perspectives have a bottom-up theory of preference formation and 
aggregation, similar to public choice. What finally emerges as the preference of the state on 
any particular issue, is just an aggregate of the preferences of sub-state actors, individual or 
collective. Two fathers of public choice, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, characterise 
the state as “nothing more than the set of processes, the machine, which allows such 
collective action to take place”. Collective action is here understood as: “the action of 
individuals when they choose to accomplish purposes collectively rather than individually”.54 
The notion of self interest as the only motivation for politicians also when they make 
decisions on behalf of their state is one of the main canons of public choice. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Hobson, The State and International Relations, p.5. 
53 Christopher Pierson, The Modern State (London: Routledge, 1996), p.80. 
54 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory – A Critique of 
Applications in Political Science (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1994), pp.16-17. 
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3.2  Individual  motivation  
 
This section will discuss the role of self-interest and national interest as motivational factors 
for politicians when they make political decisions on behalf of their state. The purpose is not 
to argue in favour of one or the other of these motivational factors as explanations of political 
behaviour, but to discuss some main positions in the academic literature on this issue. The 
section is thus limited to political questions where the individual politicians themselves or the 
sub-sector(s) of society that they represent have a private stake.  
I should rush to point out here that one cannot of course take for granted that self-
interest is always in opposition to the national interest. It is perfectly possible to imagine that 
a politician 100% guided by the norm of pursuing the national interest, could still end up 
recommending a course of action corresponding to his group’s or his personal self-interest. In 
this case the decision would still be a genuine national interest decision, but it would be 
difficult empirically to distinguish self-interest from national interest as motives. 
I start by defining some main concepts. Then I will present a short overview of the 
role of rational choice theory in political science. After this historical part I will move to the 
discussion of the problem itself, by further clarifying the different approaches to self-interest 
and public interest in the literature and by discussing in some detail how one can identify self-
interest vs. public interest motivated behaviour. I will also look into what the relationship 
between these two kinds of behaviour might look like. Some of the points in this section will 
be illustrated with examples from Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine, but these examples 
are not part of the dissertation case studies.  
 
3.2.1 Norm – role – habitus 
 
A norm is defined in the Collins Dictionary of Sociology as “a standard or rule, 
regulating behaviour in a social setting”.55 In this section I shall understand the three terms 
“norm”, “role” and “habitus” as increasingly more comprehensive expressions of the same 
phenomenon. A role can be defined as a coherent set of norms.56  According to John B. 
Thompson, Pierre Bourdieu uses the concept habitus to mean “a set of dispositions which 
incline agents to act and react in certain ways”, and these dispositions generate “practices, 
perceptions and attitudes which are regular without being consciously co-ordinated or 
                                                 
55 David Jary & Julia Jary, Collins Dictionary of Sociology (Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), 
p.453. 
56 Donald D. Searing, “Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism”, American Political 
Science Review, Vol.85, No.4 (December 1991), p.1246. 
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governed by any rule”.57 Put more simply, one could say that habitus is a set of perceptions 
and expectations that constitute the informal rules of the game. Thus, whereas role is about 
behaviour driven by considerations of appropriateness limited to the self, habitus is about 
expectations about behaviour driven by considerations of appropriateness in the social 
interactions with others.  
For the sake of simplicity, I will in this dissertation refer collectively to all the three 
concepts norm, role and habitus as norm-guided behaviour. In addition, norms, roles and 
habitus should be understood here not as moral but as cognitive categories. By that I mean 
that they can have but do not need to have a moral or immoral content. Norms of fashion, for 
example, are norms without a specific moral or immoral content. 
 
3.2.2 Self-interest versus national interest 
 
Self-interest will in this dissertation be understood both as the egoistic interest of 
individuals, and as the egoistic interests of composite actors that the individuals represent. A 
composite actor can be defined as “constellations in which the ‘intent’ of intentional action 
refers to the joint effect of coordinated action expected by the participating individuals”.58 
Thus, for example, a lobby group representing a particular section of society, a ministry, or a 
humanitarian non-governmental organisation can all be composite actors. 
In principle, any kind of desire or want can constitute a self-interest, but since this 
dissertation is particularly concerned with the import of rational choice theory from 
economics into political science, there is a need to narrow down the understanding of self-
interest. According to Brian Barry and Douglas W. Rae, interest “always appears to have 
carried an emphasis on material advantage”.59 This, on the other hand, seems too narrow, 
since one might easily imagine both individual and composite actors who have self-interests 
which do not necessarily result in material advantage. For example, to have authority can be a 
self-interest in itself, independent of whether it results in material benefit or not. A ministry 
for example, might want to increase its influence over policy not necessarily because its wants 
more staff or resources, but because the individuals within it feel outmanoeuvred by the 
individuals of another ministry. Self-interest should be understood in this dissertation on the 
                                                 
57 John B. Thompson, “Editor’s introduction” to Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p.12. 
58 Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play – Actor-Centred Institutionalism in Policy Research 
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997), p.54. 
59 Brian Barry and Douglas W. Rae, “Political Evaluation”, in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. 
Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science,Vol.1 (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p.382.  
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individual level as physical well-being and authority, and on the composite level as economic 
income and organizational survival, autonomy and growth.60 
Further, the national interest is not something with an independent existence “out 
there” which just has to be discovered. The national interest is created, and it is the character 
of the process of creation itself that determines whether the end product may be called an 
action motivated by the national interest.  
 
3.2.3 Arguing and bargaining 
 
Jon Elster defines arguing and bargaining as two different modes of communication. 
In arguing, it is the power of the better argument which is decisive, and “the parties are not 
allowed to appeal to their superior material resources”. Bargaining, on the other hand, is 
intended to force or induce one’s adversary to agree to one’s assertion. In bargaining the 
parties will use combinations of threats and promises based on their material and other 
resources.61 Bargaining situations are characterised by struggles between sets of pre-
communication preferences, whereas in arguing there is a possibility of either adjusting the 
pre-communication preferences or jointly developing new ones. It seems reasonable to argue 
that policymaking motivated by self-interest will have a tendency to appear as bargaining 
situations, whereas policymaking motivated by national interest will have a tendency to 
appear as arguing situations.62 If self-interest is the motive there will be less incentive for 
engaging in arguing. The actors will be motivated by their self-interests, which they already 
know. The national interest, on the other hand, since it has no existence of its own, needs a 
process of arguing in order to be established. That arguing has taken place, however, is no 
certain indication that national interest was the main motivation. It is perfectly possible to 
imagine that different influential groups in society engage in arguing to reach a solution 
which leaves all of them better off without taking the national interest into account. 
Consider here the case of the former Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, Oleg 
Soskovets. In February 1995 Soskovets together with Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevhen 
Marchuk initialled the text of the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. In 
Russia this came to be seen as a sell-out to the Ukrainians. Soskovets had to give concessions 
                                                 
60 This point is borrowed from Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play – Actor-Centred Institutionalism in 
Policy Research, p.64. In Scharpf, however, “social recognition” is also included under the self-interest 
heading. I see this differently, and will return in depth to the issue of “social recognition” in the 
sections dealing with norm-guided behaviour. 
61 Jon Elster, “Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblèe Constituante”, in 
Raino Malnes and Arild Underdal, eds., Rationality and Institutions – Essays in honour of Knut 
Midgaard, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992), p.15. 
62 Jon Elster, “The market and the forum: three varieties of political theory”, in Jon Elster and Aanund 
Hylland, eds., Foundations of Social Choice Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
pp.112-120.  
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by substantially rescheduling the Ukrainian energy debt payments and officially stating that 
Crimea was exclusively Ukraine’s internal affair, in order to secure the Ukrainian signature. 
In Russia many felt that a better deal for Russia could have been negotiated if Soskovets had 
not been in such a hurry.  
There was in 1995 a permanent struggle for influence over the Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin between Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and Soskovets. Chernomyrdin 
was seen as a representative of the oil and gas lobby, and Soskovets as a representative of the 
industrial and metallurgical lobbies. This conflict can fairly be characterised as an incessant 
bargaining situation, where each party continually tried to prevail over the other on a large 
number of policy issues.  
When Soskovets initialled the Russian-Ukrainian treaty, he used the fact that 
President Yeltsin had entrusted him with the mission to go to Kiev to force his policy through 
against the will of the oil and gas lobby. His claim was that initialling the deal was worth 
some delay in the Russian income from oil and gas sale. Soskovets’ motives can here be 
summarized as strengthening his political standing in the Kremlin (individual self-interest); 
increasing the export potential for the Russian metallurgical industry (group self-interest); and 
bringing Ukraine and Russia closer together (national interest). Peter Rutland has argued that 
Soskovets “believed that it was important to preserve Russia’s market share in the CIS, even 
if it meant selling energy to CIS members at less than world prices (and selling to customers 
who could not pay)”.63   
Although Soskovets was probably motivated both by self-interest and national 
interest, it seems fair to say that from a process point of view his decision was not a national 
interest decision. If Soskovets, Chernomyrdin and other politicians in the leadership with an 
interest in the topic had gathered and discussed what course of action would lead to the best 
consequences for Russia, this would have been to act in the national interest. If they had 
gathered only to discuss how both the metallurgical lobby and the oil and gas lobby could 
profit the most, this would not have been to act in the national interest even if it was a case of 
arguing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 Peter Rutland, “Oil, Politics, and Foreign policy”, in David Stuart Lane, ed., The Political Economy 
of Russian Oil (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p.183. 
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The different concepts discussed so far can be seen to be connected in the following way: 
 
national  
interest 
norm-guided
behaviour 
argumentative mode 
of communication 
self-interest instrumental 
behaviour 
bargaining mode 
of communication 
1. 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
  
3.2.4 Rational choice in political science 
 
The use of insights from economics in the explanation of political events can be traced back 
at least to the eighteenth century, but the development of rational choice as a social science 
program began in the 1950s.64 The ideal which motivated the introduction of rational choice 
theory was to achieve a degree of scientific certainty similar to the one found in the natural 
sciences. Rational choice theory did not start its rise to prominence until the 1970s. The 1950s 
and 1960s were dominated by the behavioural revolution, with its inductive approach to 
science. Theories should be constructed from observing society, and not by deducing logical 
models in the fashion of rational choice theory. By the end of the 1960s, however, there was a 
perception within political science that the behavioural revolution had not lived up to the 
expectations. In addition, there was a feeling that political science lacked the theoretical core 
which the other social science disciplines had. The ground was therefore prepared for the 
ascendancy, particularly in the USA, of the rational choice school.  
The offensive was led by Professor William Riker from the University of Rochester. 
In 1990, celebrating the dominance of rational choice in political science, Riker went as far as 
claiming that rational choice theory in reality represented the only true scientific progress ever 
made in political science. He wrote that in his opinion the reason why the social sciences had 
lagged behind the natural sciences in scientific discovery had been that “social science 
generally – microeconomics excluded – has not been based on rational choice models”.65 The 
primacy of rational choice continued, stronger in the USA than in Europe and other parts of 
the world, until the mid 1990s.  
                                                 
64 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory– A Critique of 
Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p.1. 
65 William Riker, “Political science and rational choice”, in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., 
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.177. 
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The most serious attack on rational choice theory came in 1994, with the book 
Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory by Donald Green and Ian Shapiro. They did not, as 
other previous opponents, criticise the paradigm for its proclivity towards mathematical 
models or for the desire to find scientific truth in politics, but basically called attention to 
what they saw as the rational choice non-confirmation by empirical evidence. Their main 
argument was that rational choice theorists in general had not been very interested in 
investigating whether their theories stood the test of empirical verification. Moreover, they 
concluded that those theories which had been tested had either been disconfirmed or 
confirmed with ad-hoc additions contradicting the basic premises of rational choice theory. 
Today rational choice theory is still a very influential perspective within political 
science, but it does not enjoy the prominence that it did in the 1980s and early 90s. One non-
sympathetic observer of rational choice theory, Jonathan Cohn, argued that  
 
“while the tide may finally be turning against rational choice, it’s hard not to 
survey the discipline and wonder what damage its proponents have wrought. 
Graduate students and young professors now assume that fluency in rational choice is 
a de facto requirement for tenure, and at most schools that may be correct”.66  
   
Much of the focus in rational choice has been directed towards why citizens bother 
about politics at all, such as for example regularly going to the polls to vote. They know that 
the impact of their single vote is minimal, and there are at least some costs in the process of 
finding out what the policy of the different parties is and in going to the polling station. This 
is still a mystery for the rational choice approach. Some attention has also been given to 
politicians.  In particular this rational choice attention has focused on the difference between 
understanding politicians as homo economicus or as  homo sociologicus.  
Public choice and social choice are the rational choice schools of theory that have 
taken the most explicit stance on the self-interest/national interest issue. According to Jon 
Elster, what characterises both public choice and social choice is that  
 
“they share the conception that the political process is instrumental rather 
than an end in itself, and the view that the decisive political act is a private rather than 
a public action, viz. the individual and secret vote. With these usually goes the idea 
                                                 
66 Jonathan Cohn, “When did political science forget about politics? Irrational   
Exuberance”, The New Republic, 25 October 1999, p.11, on the Internet at:
 http://www.thenewrepublic.com/archive/102599/coverstory102599.html 
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that the goal of politics is the optimal compromise between given, and irreducibly 
opposed, private interests”.67 
 
Still, some of the proponents of public choice have come to soften their insistence on 
politicians as driven only by self-interest. In particular, James Buchanan now admits that 
“homo economicus does exist in the human psyche along with many other men”.68 Still, there 
seems to have been few attempts by public choice scholars to produce hypotheses about when 
homo economicus is the decisive man and when not. 
The most famous of the theories that have emerged so far of politicians as homo 
economicus is the theory of business cycles. This theory states that governments will try to 
expand the economy to create a boom at the end of their term in power, in order to attract 
votes to win the next elections. However, it has been difficult so far to find conclusive 
empirical evidence that confirms this theory.69  
Since rational choice theory started to become popular in political science in the 
1970s and 80s, the debate between advocates and opponents has been very much 
characterised by efforts from both sides to fight for total victory. This does not mean that the 
two sides have totally denied the existence of respectively norm-guided and instrumental self-
interested behaviour. Instead they have tried to solve the theoretical challenge posed by 
disconfirming behaviour by saying that this in reality is not disconfirming behaviour but just 
one type of behaviour within their own paradigm. Thus, rational choice scholars have claimed 
that norms are followed because this is the rational thing to do, and norm theorists have 
claimed that rational self-interested action is just one among many possible norms.  
One example of this latter tendency can be found in the works of Raymond Boudon. 
He wants to maintain both types of behaviour within a rationality framework by introducing 
the notions of cognitive and instrumental rationality.70 He describes cognitive rationality as 
when “an actor does X not because he wants to generate some outcome, but because X is a 
consequence of the principles he endorses”.71 It is, nevertheless, difficult to see what this has 
achieved. Cognitive rationality seems here very similar to the common understanding of a 
norm, and it seems fair to question what purpose the concept of cognitive rationality can serve 
that the concept of norm cannot. 
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In spite of this, one could imagine that cognitive rationality refers to a more explicit 
type of norm-guided behaviour. One could make a distinction between conscious and 
unconscious norm compliance, where conscious norm compliance would be very close to 
cognitive rationality.  
In practice, however, the attempts to account for all behaviour within one of the 
theoretical schools have come at the price of destroying some of the attractive parsimony of 
each paradigm. It might therefore be a better strategy to maintain the paradigms as separate 
and relatively parsimonious frameworks of explanation, and instead try to identify when and 
under what circumstances the one or the other has the strongest explanatory power. As 
Donald Searing puts it: “simply having homo economicus do the calculations for homo 
sociologicus will not give us what we need”.72 This separation of instrumental self-interest 
behaviour and norm-guided behaviour is also, according to Robert P. Abelson, supported by 
findings from experimental research in psychology and social psychology. Abelson writes 
that “the instrumental orientation [here understood in a purely self-interested sense] can be 
conceived in part as a mindset that can be explicitly switched on or off”.73  
Still, claims that one paradigm is just a particular case of the other are often 
convincing, because it can be very difficult in practice to establish whether a certain course of 
action was motivated by a social norm or by rational self-interest. Therefore, before I go on to 
discuss what the relationship between norm-guided and instrumental self-interested behaviour 
can look like if they are maintained as separate categories, I will discuss in some more detail 
the problems of separating the one kind of behaviour from the other.  
 
3.2.5 The difference between instrumental and norm-guided behaviour 
 
So far I have argued as if the difference between instrumental and norm-guided behaviour is 
obvious. This is not necessarily always the case. In relation to the difference between self-
interest and national interest motivated behaviour there are at least two types of problems. 
First, actors might act in accordance with norms, roles or habitus because these are necessary 
instruments to cope with cognitive overflow. Reality is so complex that the actors may be 
unable to act unless there is something by which they can structure their understanding of 
reality. Fritz Sharpf attributes this function to identities. According to him, identities can 
function for the actors in the way that they “if adhered to will simplify their [the actors’]own 
choices and which, when communicated and believed, reduce the uncertainty for other 
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actors”.74 I do not use the concept of identity in this section, but it seems reasonable to argue 
that it influences behaviour much in the same way as do norms, roles and habitus. This 
function is not really about self-interest in the way the concept is defined here. Although it is 
of course in the actor’s self-interest to be capable of social interaction, the enabling function 
is not directly geared towards material advantage and/or increase in political power.  
Second, actors might act in compliance with norms to avoid social disapproval or 
sanctions from others.  Consider again the case of Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg 
Soskovets and the mentioned Ukrainian-Russian Friendship Treaty. When Soskovets was 
reproached for deciding to initial the agreement without following the norm of consulting 
with other interested actors in the Russian political leadership, he was reproached not only for 
violating the norm. Those who reproached him saw his act as resulting in material losses for 
them, and by reproaching him they could at least hope that the reproach would make 
Soskovets feel uncomfortable with this social disapproval, and that this would make it less 
likely that he would do something similar again.  
It is also likely that actors can act in accordance with norms to avoid self-disapproval. 
I would like to do A because that will serve my or my groups self-interest, but if I do A 
instead of B I know I will feel bad about it afterwards. This can also be interpreted in an 
instrumental way. Norm compliance becomes a function of the size of the gains of doing A 
versus the expected size of the discomfort inflicted upon oneself by doing A. When acting 
against norms leads to self-disapproval one can say that the norm has been internalised.75 
Although both the first and the second points above are different from my definition 
of behaviour motivated by self-interest, they both seem to have an instrumental side. The first 
is about the need for norms to enable social interaction, and the second is about the danger of 
emotional distress as a result of social disapproval. This, according to Cristina Biccieri, has 
led some scholars to look upon the functions of norms as a Nash equilibrium,76 in which no 
party has an incentive to defect. In the present context that means that as long as all parties 
see the norm as efficient in enabling social interaction they will comply with it. 
However, for the purpose of this dissertation it does not really matter whether a 
politician acted in accordance with the national interest norm because of “cognitive 
overflow”, to avoid social disapproval, or out of genuine concern for the interests of the state. 
No matter which of these, or what combination of these, was at play, they are all evidence of 
the causal effect of the norm. 
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 3.2.6 Norm-guided behaviour “look-alikes” 
 
One can also imagine modes of behaviour which look as if they are guided by the national 
interest norm, but which in reality are not. They are modes of behaviour motivated by self-
interest but in the disguise of national interest. 
First, politicians might explicitly invoke the norm of national interest to rationalize 
self-interest. This is the  “what is good for General Motors is good for America”  effect.  
Since it is illegitimate to argue for a certain kind of national policy with reference to what is 
best only for oneself, political actors will have to argue as if they had the national interest in 
mind even when they did not. This is probably the most common look-alike of norm-guided 
behaviour. It will often be difficult to distinguish between invocation of the national interest 
for self-interested action and genuine national interest. One way of doing so could be to look 
at policymaking over time on the same issue to see if the politician(s) in question maintain(s) 
coherence in defending the national interest position also when it entails losses for their self-
interest. 
Consider here the example of the Mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov. In 1994 
President Yeltsin and his political confidants in the Kremlin started to fear that Luzhkov 
could really become a dangerous competitor in the 1996 presidential elections. According to 
the Financial Times correspondent Chrystia Freeland, Yuri Luzhkov and his partner, the 
media magnate Vladimir Gusinsky, had become public enemies number one and two in the 
inner Kremlin circles.77 Luzhkov had acquired an image as a very successful administrator as 
the Mayor of Moscow, and had access to sympathetic media outlets thanks to his cooperation 
with Gusinsky. Nonetheless, he also needed a patriotic image in addition to the good 
administrator image. He therefore wanted to promote himself on an issue where he could 
appeal to a Russian self-image of pride and glory. He chose the Crimean peninsula. Crimea is 
part of Ukraine, but was for most of the time from 1783 to 1948 part of first Russia and then 
later the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic inside the Soviet Union. 
Luzhkov started his crusade to “save” Crimea, and especially the city of Sevastopol, 
from the Ukrainians, in early 1995. At the signing of an agreement on cooperation between 
Moscow and Sevastopol on 12 January 1995, Luzhkov said that by this agreement Sevastopol 
was given the status as the 11th prefect district of Moscow. He later used every opportunity to 
raise the issue of Sevastopol, and even managed to persuade the Russian Federation Council 
in December 1996 to pass a declaration stating that the city was Russian and not Ukrainian 
territory. This activity could of course be an expression of a genuine concern for Sevastopol, 
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Crimea and the identity of the Russian state (national interest), and not just a political card 
Luzhkov was playing in the Russian domestic power struggle. However, an October 1998 
press release from the Sevastopol city administration is indicative of Luzhkov not exactly 
lying sleepless at night worrying over Sevastopol. The Sevastopol City administration that 
signed the agreement with Luzhkov in 1995 stated that “the declarations of the Mayor of 
Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, on friendship and cooperation are a reality only on paper”.78 
Whether or not the Sevastopol City administration had good reason to be disappointed is of 
course difficult to judge, but the example does point to the obvious conclusion that invocation 
of the national interest is not a sufficient condition for concluding that concern for the 
national interest is also the real reason for the policy chosen. 
Second, the norm of acting in the service of the national interest can be an “ultra-
subtle expression of self interest”.79 This point is similar to the main argument of structural 
Marxist theories of the state. The structural Marxists follow the instrumental Marxists in 
saying that the state is nothing but a tool in the hands of the dominant class, but in contrast to 
the instrumental Marxists they admit that the state still may sometimes make decisions in 
defiance of the interests of the dominant class. This happens because the dominant class will 
have a tendency to be preoccupied with short-term gains, and this may be detrimental to the 
political system of the state in the longer term. It is therefore in the long-term interest of the 
dominant class to forfeit some short term gains in order to maintain the political system on 
which it depends. This idea presupposes that the status quo works to the advantage of the 
dominant class. Action in the service of the national interest that is motivated by an “ultra-
subtle expression of self interest” seems very difficult to distinguish empirically form genuine 
service of the national interest. Steven Krasner tried to do this in an analysis of the 
connections between US raw materials investments and foreign policy, but had to admit that 
this was extremely difficult.80 It might, however, be that focus on the process by which the 
decision came about in addition to a focus on the decision itself, can reveal some of the 
difference between these two types of motivation. 
 
3.2.7 Sometimes norm-guided and sometimes instrumentally self-interested 
 
Those who develop theory along the lines that actions are sometimes norm-guided and 
sometimes instrumentally self-interested, generally use empirical observations as the basis for 
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their rejecting the view that only one of the two types of behaviour is real. That is one way of 
doing it, but it can also be done theoretically. Jennifer Roback Morse has suggested a 
distinction between the calculating and the reflective person. According to her, the ability to 
step back and reflect upon our own actions and values is “the process that makes us most fully 
human”.81 If humans have the capacity to step back and analyse their own actions in terms of 
norms and self-interest, then they should also be able to go back and forth between them. 
Morse’s point is that rational choice theory tends to view humans as “pure stimulus-response 
machines”.82 Though the article in question is only about rational choice theory, much of the 
same could probably also be said about much of the literature on norms and roles. In parts of 
this literature there is little room left for humans to reflect upon the norms they follow and the 
roles they enact. Thus, the human capacity to reflect can be taken as an argument for finding 
out in which situations each of the two different types of behaviour have the best explanatory 
power and how they interact, rather than fight over which type is the best in explaining 
behaviour.  
Those who have tried to carve out separate fields for rational choice and norm-guided 
behaviour can be divided into two categories. With the terminology of John Ferejohn we can 
distinguish them as those that are concerned with either “thin” or “thick” rationality. Ferejohn 
describes the difference between “thin” and “thick” rationality as follows:  
 
“In what I call a ‘thin-rational’ account, the theorist assumes only that agents 
are (instrumentally) rational, that they efficiently employ the means available to 
pursue their ends. In a ‘thick-rational’ account, the analyst posits not only rationality 
but some additional description of agent preferences and beliefs. Thick-rational 
choice theorists generally assume that agents in a wide variety of situations value the 
same sorts of things: for example, wealth, income, or the perquisites of office”.83  
 
The case studies in this dissertation are concerned with ‘thick’ rationality. 
The efforts by some rational choice theorists to define when rational choice can be 
expected to have high explanatory power and when not is referred to by Green and Shapiro  
as segmented universalism.84 A number of hypotheses have been proposed within this trend. 
Satz and Ferejohn have postulated that “rational choice explanations are more plausible in 
settings in which individual action is severely constrained; Shumpeter and Green have 
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postulated that rational choice is likely to be more successful in the domains that are most 
similar to economics; and Maoz has postulated that rational choice is strongest in situations 
that do not involve extremely high or extremely low levels of stress.85 Stanley Kelley Jr. has 
further suggested that rational choice is likely to have the strongest explanatory power when 
goals are uncomplicated for agents; when the knowledge of how to achieve them is widely 
known; in repeated similar choice situations; when the agent cares a lot about the issue at 
hand; and in “situations that reward choices of efficient means”.86  
One way to illustrate the relationship between rational choice and norms in “thick” 
rationality is to use Jon Elster’s two-filter-model. This is the approach adopted by Adrienne 
Windhoff-Hèritier. In using this model she sees political action as being determined in the 
first filter by structures and rules (norm-guided), and in the second filter by self-interest and 
strategic decisions. According to Windhoff-Hèritier, “institutional structures and rules are 
rarely ever deterministic, in the sense that they shape behaviour fully. Instead they convey 
general orientations for action, they open “Gestaltungskorridore”, leaving room for self-
interest and strategic decisions”.87 At least three problems can be identified in this approach. 
First, it seems to exclude that self-interest can ever override structures and rules. This, 
however, obviously happens. Otherwise we would for example have no political corruption. 
Second, Windhoff-Hèritier seems to agree with public choice in that politicians at heart are 
always motivated by self-interest. The problem is just that there are so many structures and 
rules having an impact on them that the final decision ends up different from what self-
interest motivates them to do. Third, Windhoff-Hèritier seems to exclude the possibility that 
political behaviour can be both norm-guided and strategic.  
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that the norm to put national interests before private 
and factional interests should not be understood as a moral mechanism. It is a social and not a 
moral norm. As pointed out by Elizabeth Anderson: “A social norm is a standard of behaviour 
shared by a social group, commonly understood by its members as authoritative or obligatory 
for them. Social norms differ from moral norms: they need not have a moral content or be 
viewed as morally obligatory (consider norms of fashion)”.88  
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3.2.8 Neither norms nor rationality 
 
So far I have argued as if norms and rational calculations were the only possible causes for 
action. There are, however, also a large number of causes that can be called idiosyncratic 
causes, such as for example emotions, misinterpretations, standard operating procedures, or 
simply bad health.89 Many such causes might have had an impact on the outcomes that I 
discuss in the case studies. Such causes, however, have not been in focus in this project. Thus, 
the case studies should not be seen as attempts at exhaustive explorations of the various 
motives of the different leaders in the five cases. More narrowly, they should be seen as 
explorations of the contradiction between on the one hand self-interested pursuit of private 
and factional interests and on the other hand normatively inspired defence of national interests 
in these leaders’ foreign policy. It seems, however, reasonable to claim that it will be 
established through the detailed examination of the empirical material that the contradiction 
between self-interest and national interests was at the heart of each of these cases and 
observations. 
 
3.3 State theory, individual motivation, and theory on foreign policy  
 
“A significant difference exists between goals meant primarily to 
serve the nation as a state or territorial entity and goals that are of 
prime interest to individual citizens or groups of citizens in their 
private capacity. If the latter benefit the nation as a whole, this can 
only be in an indirect fashion” 
Arnold Wolfers 196290 
 
 
3.3.1 State theory and foreign policy 
 
It is fairly uncontroversial that state-society relations have an impact on the state’s domestic 
policy. It has, however, been a fairly widespread conviction among IR and Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) scholars that this is the case to a much smaller extent in foreign policy. This 
view is most pronounced within the neo-realist and neo-liberalist schools, but also prominent 
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scholars of the constructivist school share this conviction.91 J.P Nettle, a leading theorist 
dealing with state theory, and one of the few that have taken an interest in foreign policy, has 
conceded to the same view.92 If this was the case, there would be little reason to consult state 
theory in order to understand the foreign behaviour of states better. The postulation that state-
society relations are of minor importance for foreign policy, however, can be questioned. 
A number of scholars have suggested that there are indeed potential benefits for 
foreign policy analysis in using insights from state theory.93 Brian White points out that there 
are two related types of work on the state that FPA could benefit from.94 One is to typologise 
states and relate behaviour to the different types. Democratic peace theorythat democracies 
do not go to war against other democraciesis probably the most famous of these. The other 
type of work takes as its point of departure that the nature of the state as a political entity is 
poorly understood, and tries to remedy this. This dissertation falls within this second trend. 
Although these scholars’ concern with state theory indicates an unused potential for 
the improvement of foreign policy analysis, it is important to point out that state theory is not 
a total stranger to foreign policy analysis. Two works stand out as particularly important in 
this respect: the 1978 book Defending the National Interest – Raw Materials Investments and 
U.S. Foreign Policy by Stephen Krasner, and the widely quoted 1997 article Taking 
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics by Andrew Moravcsik. 
These works stand out because they take very clear and diametrically opposed stands on the 
question of where to locate the sources of a state’s foreign policy preferences. Krasner 
defends a Weberian understanding of the state. In the introduction he writes that the whole 
book is based on one fundamental assumption: “…that it is useful to conceive of a state as a 
set of roles and institutions having peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of their own that 
are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group”.95 In stark contrast 
to Krasner, Moravcsik claims that states (or other political institutions) “represent some 
subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state 
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preferences and act purposively in world politics”.96 Moravcsik thus argues for an exclusively 
society-centred (pluralist and/or Marxist) understanding of the state. 
While the two above cited works take state theory as their explicit point of departure, 
they also represent two distinguishable trends in the theory of foreign policy analysis that 
argue for positions very close to either the statist or the pluralist/Marxist positions within state 
theory.  
 
3.3.2 Theory based on statist foundations 
 
The most voluminous body of theory about states’ foreign behaviour, the systemic IR 
theories, fall squarely within the statist perspective. This is in particular true for Realism, but 
also the main theorists within Liberalism and Constructivism mostly operate from statist 
presumptions.97 The question of whether state leaders are motivated by the national interest or 
not, is seldom discussed in the works of theorists within these different schools, but rather 
comes as a logical consequence of their unitary actor perspective. Thus, national interest 
motivation is basically taken for granted.  
Realism makes assumptions about objective state interests such as power and wealth, 
and then assumes that state leaders most of the time will pursue these interests for the benefit 
of their states. Constructivism, on the other hand, sees identities and ideas rather than 
objective interests as the main motivators of states’ foreign behaviour. Adherents of 
contructivist theory admit that interests might play a motivating role, but claim that they are 
logically second to identities. They also locate the sources of state identities’ in their 
interaction with other states. This latter point has been criticized by Bill McSweeny, who 
points out that domestic societal interests might equally well be sources of states’ identities in 
the international system – “we are who we want to be”.98 McSweeny thus links constructivist 
theory to domestic societal factors, and therefore to state theory.    
One exception in terms of taking the pursuit of national interests for granted is the 
constructivist Aleksander Wendt. Wendt devotes an entire chapter in his Social Theory of 
International Politics to the problem of corporate agency, and the problem of national versus 
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private and factional preferences is explicitly discussed within that chapter. Wendt defends 
the statist perspective, among other reasons because systemic theories are theories about 
systemic outcomes and not theories about why one state acted in one particular way in one 
particular circumstance. However, he specifically mentions the usefulness of pluralism in 
“exploring the extent to which foreign behaviour is affected by domestic politics”.99 
In addition to the systemic theories, there are also a number of individual level 
theories about foreign policy that take the statist perspective for granted, including among 
others: cognitive and psychological approaches; the non-systemic variety of constructivism; 
discursive approaches; and group-think.100   
 
3.3.3 Theory based on pluralist foundations 
 
The theorists discussed in the following section can with a generic term be labelled 
pluralist theorists of foreign policy analysis. In addition to the previously discussed 
contribution by Moravcsic, which can be characterised as part of a “Structural Liberal” theory 
of international politics explicitly based on a pluralist understanding of the state, the most 
voluminous body of theory that depart from the national interests focus is the bureaucratic 
politics paradigm.101 The most prominent study here is Graham Allison’s Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis from 1971, which Allison relaunched in a new 
edition together with Philip Zelikow in 1999.102 Similar to the systemic theories, the 
bureaucratic politics perspective to a very little extent discusses the relationship between 
national and private and factional interests. While the systemic theories take for granted that 
politicians are motivated by national interests, most research within bureaucratic politics 
seem to take for granted that politicians are motivated mostly by private and factional 
interests. So much so, that Eric Stern and Bertjan Verbeek, in an article surveying the 
development of bureaucratic politics, point to the too firm rooting of bureaucratic politics in 
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public choice and the resulting inability “to move beyond the distributional struggle”.103 This 
criticism, however, is not true for all research within bureaucratic politics.  
The “where you stand depends of where you sit” axiom seems to underpin most 
bureaucratic politics research, but this axiom does not necessarily presuppose private or 
factional interests as motivation. Some bureaucratic politics research points to the bargaining 
among governmental agencies to promote their perception of the national interest, but where 
this perception comes from the particular perspective on national interests that any one 
agency develops as a natural result of this particular agency’s functions. The defence ministry 
might come to see national interests different from the foreign ministry, even if both are 
motivated by national interests, simply because they have different functions in the state 
apparatus. 104 Here, the bureaucratic infighting is not the result of clashing parochial interests 
but of clashing world views.  
Skidmore and Hudson have pointed out that what is missing in bureaucratic politics 
is more focus on “how state decision-makers either cooperate with, resist, or compromise 
with such [interest] groups”.105 This is where the present project fits in. Thus, what is to be 
explained is not the activity of domestic governmental and non-governmental actors in trying 
to put pressure on the decision-makers based on their parochial interests, but instead what the 
decision-makers themselves do when they are faced with this pressure.  
A number of scholars have tried to develop testable hypotheses on this issue. Douglas 
van Bell, squarely within the rational choice school, has proposed a number of hypotheses 
based on the assumption that decision-makers make foreign policy decisions based on 
calculations about how different courses of action will affect their standing among powerful 
domestic groups, and found support for his hypotheses in a number of case studies from US 
foreign policy (Panama and Grenada invasions).106  
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James Lee Ray share van Bell’s assumption about 
decision-makers basically being motivated by the desire to secure their domestic political 
standing, also in making decisions on foreign policy, but they make a distinction between 
democratic and non-democratic regimes in this regard. Bueno De Mesquita and Ray argue 
that leaders in semi-democratic or authoritarian regimes are more likely than leaders in 
democratic regimes to let their foreign-policy decisions be influenced by groups that are 
important for their domestic political standing  
                                                 
103 Eric Stern and Bertjan Verbeek, “Conclusions: Toward a Neopluralist Approach to Bureau-
Governmental Politics”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.42, No.2 (November 1998), p.242. 
104 On this point, see Brian Ripley, “Cognition, Culture, and Bureaucratic Politics”, in Laura Neack, 
Jeanne A. K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, eds., Foreign Policy Analysis – Continuity and Change in Its 
Second Generation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), p.88. 
105 David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, “Establishing the Limits of State Autonomy…”, p.5. 
106 See Douglas van Bell, “Domestic Imperatives and Rational Models of Foreign Policy Decision 
Making”, in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., The Limits of State Autonomy, pp. 151-183. 
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 “Democratic leaders tend to be deposed or retained primarily in response to 
their performance in producing public goods, the type of good on which the absolute 
size of their winning coalitions, as well as large size of those coalitions relative to the 
selectorates in such systems, leads them to focus. Autocratic leaders are retained or 
deposed, in contrast, primarily on the basis of their provision of private goods that are 
able to purchase the loyalty of their winning coalitions, which are relatively small 
both in absolute terms and relative to the size of the selectorates.”107  
 
Steven R. David has developed a slightly different perspective on the relationship 
between the private interests of leaders and foreign policy. In his theory on alignment patterns 
in the Third World, similarly to pluralist scholars, he largely discards national interests as 
main motivators. However, in contrast to most pluralists he focuses not on domestic but on 
foreign sources of power whose help is needed in order for politicians to stay in power.108 
The present dissertation seeks to investigate the theoretical propositions discussed 
above, and study whether leaders of illiberal democracies let pressure groups have it their way 
in foreign policy in order for these politicians to stay in power, or if they are willing to defy 
the pressure from these groups in order to pursue what they perceive to be the national 
interest.  
    
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
4.1 The relationship between theory and data 
 
To clarify the relationship between theory and data it is necessary to define what the 
chosen cases are cases of. Charles C. Ragin argues that this can be done by an operation he 
calls “casing”. According to Ragin: “In short, the continuous web of human social life must 
be sliced and diced in a way compatible with the goal of testing the generality of theoretical 
ideas, and comparable objects of research must be established so that boundaries can be 
placed around measurement operations”.109 In practice this can be done through a sequence of 
                                                 
107 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & James Lee Ray, “The National Interest Versus Individual Ambition: 
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Johns Hopkins Press, 1991) and Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment”, World 
Politics, Vol.43, No.2 (1991), pp.233-257. 
109 Charles C. Ragin, “Casing and the process of social inquiry”, in Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. 
Becker, eds., What is a Case?-  Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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several steps, where the researcher gradually narrows down the scope of the universe for 
which the theoretical findings are supposed to be valid. For my project the “casing” looks like 
this: 
 
First casing: Foreign policy questions where the leader faces pressure from domestic 
collective societal actors who have foreign policy preferences,  
 
Second casing: where disregard of these preferences might lead to defections from the 
leader’s winning coalition which in turn diminishes his current and future power to rule 
and/or win the next elections,  
 
Third casing: in countries characterised by illiberal democracy. 
 
A possible fourth casing could have been to narrow down the scope to foreign policy  
at one particular level. Charles F. Herman has developed a typology of four different levels of 
foreign policy change: adjustment change; program change; problem/goal change; and 
international orientation change.110 To choose, for example, instances only at the level of 
adjustment change would have been a possible fourth casing. However, I have chosen not to 
do this. This would have put restrictions on my case selection making it hard to find cases 
with enough available empirical evidence. Besides, selecting cases at different levels of 
foreign policy decision-making gives an opportunity to study whether the level of foreign 
policy decisions itself can be a potential posterior variable having an effect on the willingness 
to defy domestic pressure groups. One major problem in this process-tracing is what 
philosophers call the “Other mind” problem, which refers to the difficulty of uncovering 
another person’s true motives for a certain course of action. This is a problem that cannot be 
fully solved, because one cannot access another person’s mind by anything else than 
inference. There is, however, reason to believe that one can come some way by inference, and 
that it therefore is a worthwhile effort.111  
 
4.2 Method of comparison 
 
This study is comparative. My method of comparison is close to what John Stuart 
Mill called the method of concomitant variation. According to James Mahoney, this method is 
                                                 
110C.F Herman, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 1990), p.5. 
111 For more on this, see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.171-176.  
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based on ordinal comparison, and the focus is “the degree to which a given phenomenon is 
present”.112 The phenomenon in question here is the degree to which the leaders in the 
different case studies are willing to disregard pressure from interest groups in order to pursue 
what they consider to be in the national interest. Mahoney goes on to say that “scholars who 
use this method assess causality by exploring the co-variation between ordinal scores on an 
explanatory variable and an outcome variable”.113 In the present dissertation, the explanatory 
variable can be defined as willingness on behalf of the leader to disregard factional pressure 
even when this can have negative consequences for his ability to rule and to continue to stay 
in power, and the outcome variable can be defined as degree to which the actually 
implemented foreign policy reflects national interest thinking versus being nothing more than 
an accumulation of  factional and private interests. 
There are three main reasons for this choice of method. First, my variables are at the 
ordinal level in the sense that I analyse the degree of statist and societal preferences and not 
the presence or absence of such preferences. Mill’s other two methods often used in 
comparative studies with small N`s are the method of agreement and the method of 
difference. These, however, operate with variables at the nominal level. Second, the method 
of concomitant variation opens for causal inference that is probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. This is not the case with the method of agreement and method of difference. 
Given my theoretical point of departure and my small N, I feel that probabilistic conclusions 
are more warranted than deterministic ones.114 Third, and directly related to the former point, 
the method of concomitant variation does not require a pattern of perfect co-variation to infer 
causality.115  
The main problem with using the method of concomitant variation in small N 
analyses is that it does not give a good basis for eliminating alternative explanatory variables, 
such as for example the above mentioned idiosyncratic variables. This weakness, however, 
can at least partly be compensated for by within-case analysis. Mahoney mentions three kinds 
of within-case analysis: process matching, process tracing and causal narrative.116 For this 
project I feel that process-tracing will be the most appropriate method. Andrew Bennett and 
Alexander George define process-tracing as: ”to generate and analyse data on the causal 
mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations and other intervening variables, that 
                                                 
112 James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis”, American 
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link putative causes to observed effects”.117 Mahoney suggests three ways in which process-
tracing can enhance the basis of inference: it can help in avoiding mistaking a spurious 
correlation for a causal association; it can help in rejecting alternative explanatory variables; 
and it can be used to support the explanations derived from the concomitant variation 
analysis.118 Thus, the combination of Mill’s method of concomitant variation and the within-
case method of process-tracing should be a reasonable methodological foundation for drawing 
conclusions. 
The idea of the method of process-tracing is linked to a broader debate in 
methodology and the philosophy of science about the nature of causality. Some scholars focus 
only on the correlation between variables as a basis for making causal claims, whereas others 
focus on the process by which the independent variables have an effect on the dependent 
variable. The former talk about causal effect whereas the latter talk about causal mechanisms. 
A broader discussion of the relative merits of causal effect and causal mechanisms when it 
comes to making causal claims is beyond the scope of this project. I here take the position of 
Bennett and George that both forms of analysis are warranted, and this position is also 
reflected in my research design. Process-tracing can also have a function in addition to 
searching for and potentially eliminating alternative explanatory variables, it can be used to 
identify the values on the ordinal variables for each observation.  
 
4.3 On the possibility of theoretical inference 
 
This is a small N study. As such, quantitatively oriented scholars will question the 
possibility of theoretical inference compared with large N studies. I have tried to increase this 
possibility in two ways: by studying several observations of the same phenomena within each 
case study, and by selecting cases with extreme values on important dimensions. 
 
One can usefully make a distinction between cases and observations.119 If the N of this study 
is based on observations rather than cases, the N will be 15 and not 5. (If it had been based on 
leaders rather than cases it would have been 4 and not 5). I study three observations in the 
first case study, four observations in the second case study, one observation in the third case 
study, three observations in the fourth case study, and four observations in the fifth case 
study. In principle, therefore, one could argue that each case study in this project consists of a 
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number of smaller case studies. My cases are what Yin has called embedded case studies, 
where “within a single case, attention is also given to a subunit or subunits”.120 
Although I can claim that my N is 15, this is a slightly inferior N as far as theoretical 
inference is concerned because of “dependence”. Dependence means that the observations do 
not represent totally independent tests of the theory because one must suspect that due to their 
closeness they influenced each other. For instance, in case number two, how Yeltsin 
disregarded the pressure from the arms producers lobby in connection with the 1995 no-
further-sales- to-Iran-agreement with Al Gore, might have influenced how he handled the 
similar pressure from the military-industrial lobby during the Primakov premiership 1998-
1999. Thus, even though my N is 15, it is an N that gives less reason to be sure about the 
theoretical inferences than if I for example had studied private and factional interest and their 
influence on foreign policy in 15 different countries. 
An additional problem in terms of theoretical inference is also that all my cases come 
from the post-Soviet context. Thus, there might be peculiarities of this context that affect the 
explanatory and dependent variables that are not present, or present to a smaller degree, in 
other geographical settings. However, here the potential loss in the possibility of theoretical 
inference has to be weighted against the necessity of conducting good quality process-tracing. 
This is much easier in an environment that the researcher knows well, and where he is able to 
evaluate the sources of information better. 
My project is further placed within a tradition in comparative research of studying 
cases with extreme values on important dimensions.121 By this is meant that both the three 
countries from where the case studies are taken, and the five cases themselves, have 
frequently been commented on as countries and cases where private and factional preferences 
have been assumed to have had particularly strong influence on political decision-making. 
Philip Roeder has claimed that “post-Soviet politics is dominated by self-interested politicians 
who seek to maximize their control over the policy process”.122 Similarly, Alexandr Mau has 
argued that “the state foreign policy (in Russia) reflects interests of certain influential groups 
and alliances. Any changes in the foreign policy are in most cases illustrative of the changes 
in the degree of influence of the lobby groups and deeper processes inside the political and 
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business elite”.123 In the case of Ukraine, Swedish economist and former economic adviser to 
the Ukrainian president, Anders Åslund, called the Ukrainian state a “closed joint-stock 
company, led by four clans: the Rabinovich-Volkov clan; the Bakay-Holubchenko clan; the 
Surkis-Medvedchuk clan; and the successors of Alik the Greek”.124 As far as Kazakhstan is 
concerned, the Kazakh journalists Zhanna Bolatova and Erik Zhunusov assert that “all high 
politics is a matter of money”.125 In addition to these empirical claims, there is also the  
assertion within the theoretical literature on illiberal democracies, that these regimes are 
particularly prone to let private and factional interest influence policy.126 
If a willingness to disregard private and factional interests can be demonstrated also 
in these cases, that should indicate that they will have even stronger explanatory power in 
political communities where such interests are assumed to have less influence. That is, they 
should be applicable to cases also in the second casing.  
 
4.4 Methodological summary 
 
The methodology of my research design can be summarised in three main points: 
 
First, I will study instances where a leader faces pressure from domestic interest groups that 
have certain foreign policy preferences, and where a tendency to give in to such pressure is 
assumed to be a part of the political culture. As explained earlier, however, my findings in 
this regard can also have implications for states where that is not he case. 
 
Second, through the technique of process-tracing I will try to establish to what extent these 
leaders were willing to disregard this pressure and also other self-interest considerations in 
order to pursue national interests. 
 
Third, I try to enhance the possibility of theoretical inference from these cases by focusing in 
the conclusion on the 15 observations listed below, rather than the five case studies. 
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List of observations: 
 
First case study “Defining a Ukrainian Foreign Policy Identity: Business Interests and Geopolitics in 
the Formulation of Ukrainian Foreign Policy 1994-1999” 
 
1. The change from pro-Western to pro-Russian foreign policy after Kuchma’s election in 1994 
as an expression of the preferences of the East-Ukrainian industrial elite. 
2. The change back to a more pro-Western foreign policy in 1995 after major elements of the 
East-Ukrainian industrial elite had changed their foreign policy preferences. 
3. No change back to a pro-Russian foreign policy despite the fact that the pro-Russian oil and 
gas elite replaced the East-Ukrainian industrial elite as the domestic power base of Kuchma. 
 
Second case study “Arming the Ayatollahs – Economic Lobbies in Russia’s Iran Policy” 
 
4. 1990 – 1995, heavy conventional arms sales to Iran as an expression of the sectoral 
dominance of the military-industrial lobby in the government. 
5. 1995, signing of the secret Gore-Chernomyrdin no-sales agreement as an expression of the 
replacement of the military-industrial lobby by the oil and gas and financial lobbies as 
dominant sectoral lobbies in the government. 
6. 1995 – 2000, no reopening of sales despite the re-emergence of an influential military-
industrial lobby in the presidential administration 1995-1997, and the strongly pro-VPK 
Primakov government 1998-1999. 
7. Reopening of arms sales in November 2000, after the military-industrial lobby had been 
instrumental in securing Putin victory in the March 2000 presidential elections. 
 
Third case study “Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian 
Foreign Policy”: 
 
8. Putin’s decision to abandon the Primakov doctrine in favour of strategic partnership with the 
West despite heavy elite opposition 
 
Fourth case study “Astana’s Privatised Independence – Private and National Interests in the Foreign 
Policy of Nursultan Nazarbayev” 
 
9. Early 1990s – Nazarbayev seeking junior partnership with Moscow in order to secure his 
position 
10. Second half of 1990s – Nazarbayev standing up to Moscow and seeking partnership with the 
USA: 
a. Less danger of loosing position because no longer fear of ethnic uprising + enormous 
increases in income from oil and gas 
b. Stood up to domestic lobbies (oil lobby and military-industrial lobby) 
11. After 2000 – Nazarbayev’s return to Moscow’s protection largely because his own position 
again was threatened 
 
Fifth case study “Private Interests, Public Policy – Ukraine and the Common Economic Space 
agreement” 
 
12. Kuchma’s promotion of the CES agreement from February 2003 to September 2003 to attract 
Moscow’s support 
13. Kuchma’s threat to withdraw Ukraine from the CES process in October 2003 despite risk of 
loosing Moscow’s support 
14. Yanukovych’s resistance to the CES agreement despite risk of loosing Moscow’s support 
15. Yanukovych’s abandonment of resistance to the CES agreement to attract Moscow’s support
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 4.5 The Sources 
 
I have been using three types of sources in this project: Russian, Ukrainian and 
Kazakhstani newspaper and journal articles; Western newspaper and journal articles on 
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan; and to some extent interviews with politicians and 
academics in Russia and Ukraine.  
Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakhstani newspaper and journal articles were the most 
important sources. The main methodological problem with this type of sources is that their 
reliability can be questioned. Although good independent journalism exists in all three 
countries, it is probably fair to say that it has so far not been the norm. However, the number 
of publications in all three countries covering the topics of my case studies is sufficiently 
large and diverse so that at least it was possible to compare different interpretations of the 
same events.  
Western newspaper and journal articles were an important additional source of 
information. Western newspapers are arguably on average more reliable than the Russian, 
Ukrainian and Kazakhstani ones. They are owned by actors of whom most do not have a 
personal stake in the different political struggles in the countries in question. On the other 
hand, Western publications do not always have stationed correspondents in these countries, 
and often lack much of the detailed insight that the Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakhstani 
journalists have. A particular problem here is that most Western newspapers have a stationed 
correspondent only in Moscow, who is also responsible for covering the other Post-Soviet 
countries. This correspondent will occasionally go to these countries to write stories, but it is 
my impression from reading many such articles that they often have a tendency to see events 
through Moscow’s eyes. Western journal articles and books provide an important correction 
to such bias. They are often based on thorough studies of primary sources where the author 
has already made considerable efforts to construct reliable interpretations from the available 
evidence.  
In addition, there are at least three further points worth mentioning that strengthen the 
reliability of the findings in this dissertation. Firstly, I would like to add that as far as the 
Russian and Ukrainian newspapers and journals are concerned, the present author has 
followed their development relatively closely over the last 10 years. It therefore seems fair to 
say that I have acquired some degree of experience in evaluating the reliability of both the 
different publications and individual journalists.  
Secondly, I have for the last seven years been in regular contact with many members 
from social science expert milieus on Post-Soviet affairs; Russians, Ukrainians as well as 
Westerners. Thus, I have been able to discuss and also nuance my interpretations of political 
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developments in the three countries where the case studies are taken from on a relatively 
frequent basis.  
And thirdly, it is a test of reliability that all the cases studies in this dissertation either 
have been published or have been accepted for publication in peer reviewed publications. For 
each case study this means that at least two other experts in the field have found the empirical 
claims made in the case studies to be reasonable.   
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